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NOTE
CURFEW ORDINANCES AND THE CONTROL OF
NOCTURAL JUVENILE CRIME *
I. INTRODUCTION
The increased public concern regarding the frequency and gravity
of juvenile crime since the termination of the second world war ' has given
impetus to state and municipal legislation expanding police power to cope
with the problem.2 One response has been the enactment of municipal 3
and, in some instances, state 4 curfew legislation for juveniles.5  In general,
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of the late Justice Wiley Rutledge.
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1. The number of persons arrested in the United States under eighteen years of
age increased from 31,750 in 1948 to 234,474 in 1956. During the same period the
percentage of arrests of persons under eighteen years of age as compared to total
arrests increased from 42% to 11.3%. Changes in some of the more serious crimes are:
1948 1956
No. of Percentage No. of Percentage
persons of total persons of total
arrested arrests arrested arrests
under 18 under 18
Criminal Homicide 208 3.1 213 6.2
Robbery 1,121 5.4 2,692 24.7
Assault 1,157 2.0 7,531 7.3
Rape 773 8.1 840 18.3
Larceny 6,093 8.9 46,477 50.4
Auto Theft 3,030 17.1 18,622 66.4
FBI, 19 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 117 (1948) ; FBI, 27 UNnORM CRIME REPORTS 110
(1956).
2. See AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, How CITIES CONTROL JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY 33-35 (1957).
3. Appendix A at p. 102 infra.
4. See text and notes at notes 91-97 infra.
5. Historically, curfews can be traced at least as far back in history as William
the Conqueror. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 306 (1957 ed.). In the pre-Civil War
United States, curfew laws existed in southern towns indicating the times at which
slaves were required to be off the streets. Ibid. Curfew legislation aimed at juveniles
received its first substantial support in the latter portion of the nineteenth century.
President Benjamin Harrison then called the curfew "the most important municipal
regulation for the protection of the children of American homes, from the vices of the
street. . . " ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 306 (3d ed. 1925). In 1884 Colonel
Alexander Hogeland, "the Father of the curfew law," urged the adoption of curfew
ordinances at the National Convention of the Boys and Girls Home Employment
Association. Ibid. His recommendations were heeded in many instances and re-
ceived substantial support in the periodicals. See Townsend, Curfew for City Children,
163 N. AM. REv. 725 (1896). But see Buch, Objections to a Children 's Curfew, 164
(66)
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curfew ordinances prohibit juveniles from remaining in public places or
on the streets 6 after a stated hour in the evening,7 and provide penalties
for repeated violations to be imposed on the juvenile 8 and/or on those
legally responsible for the conduct of the juvenile. 9 The purpose and
justification of this legislation is ultimately to reduce juvenile crime, but
its efficacy and social desirability are matters of vigorous dispute.10
Advocates of a curfew, aside from agreement on the unassailable com-
munity objective of curbing juvenile criminal activity, are often as far
apart from each other in their reasons for support of the measure as they
are from those who oppose it. To some the curfew is an experiment,
worth trying as a last resort where all other measures have apparently
failed. To others the curfew is looked upon as a panacea, the logic of
their argument being that nocturnal juvenile crime must necessarily be
eliminated when children are constrained by the threat of legal sanction
to remain at home. Some persons subscribe to the view that juveniles
ought to be at home at night regardless of their individual dispositions to
do wrong, and that therefore the curfew makes law of what is morally
right. Similarly, the curfew is thought by some to promote family life by
encouraging children to be at home. Undoubtedly there is some element
of truth in each of these asserted justifications, but at best they are incon-
clusive and serve only to shift the focus of attention from more basic
legislative considerations such as whether the curfew can be enforced, the
opportunities for police abuse in enforcement, how much criminal activity
is likely to be affected by the ordinance, what is the prevalence of noctural
juvenile crime, and what sacrifices are being required of individuals not
N. A.m. REv. 381 (1897). At that time urban juvenile crime was attributed to the
lack of parental responsibility, thought to exist chiefly among the large numbers of
immigrant families then entering the United States. Townsend, supra at 725. Cur-
fews were envisaged as a device to curb unwholesome juvenile activity, primarily by
enforcing parental responsibility on these families. Ibid. By the turn of the century
approximately three thousand municipalities and villages had adopted such ordinances.
8 ExcycLoPniA AmRCANA 306 (1957 ed.). Interest in curfews then waned until
the second world war. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, MUNICI-
PALITIES AND THE LAW IN ACTION 58 (1944). With parents in the armed forces or
working in war industries, often on night shifts, and with the influx of servicemen
into urban areas, control of juveniles became an increasingly difficult task. Resultant
wartime curfews attempted to prevent juveniles from roaming the streets or loitering
in public places. However, even under the strained conditions of the wartime emer-
gency, curfew legislation was not without its critics. WELCH, THE CuRFEw-Is IT
A DESIRABLE MEAstRm? (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, 1943). Conclusion
of the war did not produce any decline in the incidence of juvenile crime, but rather
occasioned a marked increase in delinquency, see note 1 supra, with a concomitant
increased interest in curfew measures.
6. See text and notes at notes 48-57 infra.
7. See text and notes at notes 2742 infra.
8. See text and notes at notes 65-75 infra.
9. See text and notes at notes 76-90 infra.
10. E.g., letter from Elizabeth B. Brown, Police Department, Portland, Oregon,
Oct. 8, 1957, expressed favor toward curfews. Letter from Oscar F. Brewer, Police
Department, Duluth, Minnesota, Aug. 20, 1957, expressed opposition toward curfews.
These and all other communications cited in this Note were sent to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review and are on file in the Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
1958]
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likely to engage in anti-social behavior. More sympathy is deserving to
those curfew supporters who seek justification on the narrower ground
that it is a necessary police device designed to control nighttime accumula-
tion of juveniles in public places with its attendant risk of mischief.
Opponents of the curfew urge a variety of objections to curfew enact-
ments, emphasizing an asserted improbability of its success. Primarily,
they contend that the peak of juvenile criminal activity is in the early
hours of the evening, before the time at which curfews usually go into
effect. They argue that only a small portion of the juvenile population
engages in criminal activity, and that the curfew is a shotgun approach,
encroaching on the many who are innocent to control the dissident few.
They stress further that effective enforcement of a general curfew is well
beyond the physical capabilities of existing police forces. Finally, they
point to the tendency of a curfew to shift the focus of attention from other
more immediate problems of delinquency." But despite this vigorous
protest curfew measures have been adopted in many of the metropolitan
areas of the United States.
In an attempt to shed some light on the problem this Note has as its
purpose the determination of (1) the prevalence of curfew legislation; (2)
the conduct proscribed, the penalties imposed and the persons held re-
sponsible; (3) the judicial administration of the curfew in Philadelphia
(where personal observations were made) ; (4) the likelihood that the
curfew achieves the purposes ascribed to it; and (5) the constitutional
validity of such ordinances. The data presented in this Note were gathered
between June and September 1957.
II. THE ORDINANCES ANALYZED
A. The Prevalence of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances
In an effort to determine the prevalence of juvenile curfew ordinances
throughout the United States, questionnaires were sent to the chiefs of
police of 109 cities with populations over 100,000 persons. 2 Information
was requested as to whether a curfew ordinance existed in the particular
city, and, if so, the terms of such ordinance and specified results achieved
thereunder. Responses were received from 103 cities 13 representing 94.5
per cent of those contacted. Fifty-seven (55.3 per cent) of the reporting
cities had curfew ordinances in effect and forty-six (44.7 per cent) did not.
11. Many of these arguments are made with respect to the Philadelphia curfew
ordinance and are set forth in PHILADELPHIA DIsTRICT HEALTH AND WELFAm COUNCIL,
STATEMENT ON CURFEW (Dec. 4, 1954).
12. The list of cities surveyed is found in INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGER'S
AsSOCIATION, MUNIcIPAL YEAR Boox 523-70 (1956). This list was based on the
census of 1950.
13. Appendix A at p. 102 infra more fully describes the scope of this survey.
Except where indicated the information reported in this section was compiled from
letters to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review from police officials of the
several municipalities.
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Of the reporting cities without curfews thirty-three neither offered
an explanation for their absence nor indicated whether future adoption
was anticipated. While generalization from the remaining responses is
difficult, some of the reasons advanced for non-adoption may have general
application. Four' 4 of the remaining thirteen cities stated merely that
the delinquency problem was not so severe as to warrant such an enact-
ment.15 Two cities, Fort Wayne, Indiana and Houston, Texas, had not
enacted curfews because they believed their respective state statutes de-
fining juvenile delinquency included conduct normally encompassed by
a curfew, making further enactments on their part unnecessary.16 Wash-
ington, D. C. and Kansas City, Kansas reported that the adoption of a
curfew ordinance was under consideration.'1 On the other hand, South
Bend, Indiana abandoned a proposal to adopt a curfew because "too many
people [were] against such a law." 18 An interesting situation was reported
in both Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Atlanta, Georgia where the police
departments admitted to the enforcement of an "unofficial curfew," even
though the councils of these cities had not enacted such legislation. The
police departments of both municipalities established "curfew hours." The
departments outlined their practices under the "curfew" as follows: if
children are found on the streets after the "curfew" hour, the contacting
police officer records their names and addresses and those of their parents,
as well as their reasons for being away from home. This information is
forwarded to the appropriate juvenile authorities and is used only for
informational purposes in the event that the child subsequently becomes
involved in a juvenile offense. Occasionally the parents are contacted
and their cooperation is enlisted in the control of their children.19
Nine of the fifty-seven cities which have curfew ordinances reported
that they were not enforced2 0 Generally, non-enforcement was attributed
to the fact that at the time of inquiry juvenile delinquency problems were
at a level that obviated the need for enforcement. Youngstown, Ohio,
14. Jersey City, New Jersey; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Scranton, Pennsylvania;
Providence, Rhode Island.
15. Miami, Florida had a curfew ordinance which was recently declared uncon-
stitutional. Riley v. City of Miami, Chancery No. 198087, Cir. Ct. of 11th Cir. of Fla.,
April 5, 1957. The constitutionality of curfew ordinances is considered at notes 180-91
infra.
16. State legislation in the curfew area is discussed in text and notes at notes 91-
97 infra.
17. Louisville, Kentucky reported that the members of the law enforcement agen-
cies of the community would welcome the passage of a curfew ordinance.
18. A curfew ordinance should not be enacted "unless considerable sentiment in
favor is found to exist among the better classes of citizens in the community, and
especially among the school and church leaders." AMERICAN MUNICIPAL AssocIATION,
INFORMATION MEmORANDum No. 48-2-CuRFmiV ORDINANCES (March 19, 1948).
19. The Baton Rouge curfew goes into effect at 11:00 p.m. and that of Atlanta
at midnight. No exceptions are made by the police in Atlanta and the curfew is
enforced against all persons below eighteen years of age. No data on these latter
points was received from Baton Rouge.
20. Montgomery, Alabama; Rockford, Illinois; Shreveport, Louisiana; Grand
Rapids, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; Syracuse, New York; Youngstown, Ohio;
Chattanooga, Tennessee; Spokane, Washington.
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however, explained its failure to enforce the existing curfew on the ground
that it was difficult to enforce and imposed added burdens upon the police
department. 2'
B. Curfew Provisions
Forty-eight municipalities with populations over 100,000 persons re-
ported having curfew ordinances which were enforced. These generally
varied in form according to the age group included, the curfew hours, the
conduct prohibited, the conduct excepted, and the degree of responsibility
placed on the minor, the parent and other persons. This section will analyze
the variations with a discussion, wherever feasible, of the rationale and
implications of each.
1. Age Groups of Minors Subject to Curfews
All of the ordinances submitted by cities participating in the survey
designated a specific age group subject to the curfew.m Although in most
instances no distinction as to age is made between males and females, two
cities so provide.2 3  The following chart presents a summary of the age
groups subject to the ordinances examined.
TABLE I
Age of Children Subject to Curfew in Cities With Populations
Larger Than 100,000
Persons Number
Under of Cities
14 2
15 4
16 13
17 924
1825 1726
21 3
21. This objection is often advanced by opponents of curfews. The reply that is
made is that rigorous curfew enforcement ultimately reduces juvenile delinquency and
hence lessens the work load of police. Experience does not support this reply. See
text at notes 173-78 infra.
22. Some smaller municipalities with less carefully drawn ordinances do not desig-
nate a specific age group, but use the word "minor" instead. While such a vague
ordinance may lead to confusion on the part of police and children alike, they are
generally interpreted as applying to persons under 18 years of age, although the legal
age of minority is generally considered to be 21. See COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE
ORDINANCE BULL, AN ANALYSIS OF CuRFEw ORDINANCES IN COLORADO (1956).
23. Buffalo, New York restricts males under 12 years of age and females under
14. The Peoria, Illinois ordinance covers males under 21 years of age and females
under 18. These ordinances have been entered in Table 1 in the highest age group
subject to the respective curfews.
24. The Philadelphia curfew ordinance follows the majority for its population
group, its age group being minors under the age of 17 years.
25. San Francisco, California has an additional provision in its ordinance pro-
hibiting three or more persons under 21 to congregate or engage in any sport or make
any noise on any public street from 8:00 p.m. to daylight.
26. The curfew ordinance presently in force in Gary, Indiana covers children
under 15 years of age. However, an amendment thereto which has passed two read-
ings of council at the time of writing raises the age to children under 18.
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2. Hours of Curfew
The curfew ordinances exhibit no consistency in the designation of
curfew hours. The effective curfew hours range from 8:00 p.m.2 7 to 12
midnight 28 Most ordinances designate a specific time when the curfew
is lifted, ranging from 3:00 a.m.2 9 to 6:00 a.m.,80 while others use a term
such as "sunrise"3 1 or "daylight." - Three ordinances, however, do not
designate any time for the termination of the curfewPas Such an ordinance
is the product of poor draftsmanship as it serves only to create confusion
on the part of both law enforcement officers and the public and permits
legal attack on the validity of the ordinance on the ground of vagueness. 8 4
The time limitations in most curfews are constant throughout the week,
do not vary during the year, and apply equally to all age groups subject
to the curfew. However, three variations from the general pattern, exist-
ing singly or in combination, can be found: age-time variations,3 5 seasonal-
time variations, 6 and weekend-time variations 7  In the age-time varia-
tion, different curfew hours are imposed on various agc groups: the older
the child the later his curfew begins. 38 This provision evidently is based
on the assumption that it is more reasonable to require a younger child
to be home at an earlier hour than an older child, particularly since a
younger child is less likely to have legitimate business at night. However,
it would seem that a basic disadvantage to this subclassification is the
27. New Haven, Connecticut.
28. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
29. New Haven, Connecticut. The hours of curfew in New Haven are from 8:00
p.m. to 3:00 a.m. The efficacy of such provisions is questionable. If the juvenile
delinquency problem is so acute as to warrant an 8 o'clock curfew it would seem that
permitting children to be on the streets after 3:00 a.m. would not further the aims
of curfew enactment, Cf. note 25 supra.
30. E.g., San Francisco, California; Tampa, Florida.
31. E.g., Los Angeles, California; Oakland, California.
32. E.g., San Diego, California; Richmond, Virginia.
33. Evansville, Indiana; Flint, Michigan; Knoxville, Tennessee.
34. The ordinances of Evansville, Indiana and Flint, Michigan impose as one of
the penalties for curfew violation imprisonment of the violator. It would seem that
this would warrant considering the ordinance criminal in nature. It is generally held
that in order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of procedural due process a
criminal statute must establish ascertainable standards of guilt so that men of common
intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. See, e.g.,
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939). A curfew lacking any ascertainable time of termination would not seem to
satisfy these standards of definiteness.
35. Detroit, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbus,
Ohio; Portland, Oregon (see note 37 infra) ; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Wash-
ington (see note 36 infra).
36. Phoenix, Arizona; Jacksonville, Florida; Elizabeth, New Jersey; Buffalo,
New York; Seattle, Washington (see note 35 supra).
37. San Jose, California; Denver, Colorado; Chicago, Illinois; Peoria, Illinois;
Wichita, Kansas; Camden, New Jersey; Portland, Oregon (see note 35 supra);
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
38. E.g., Minneapolis, Minnesota (under 14, 9:30 p.m.; 14-18, 11:00 p.m.); Salt
Lake City, Utah (under 14, 10:00 p.m.; under 18, 11:00 p.m.).
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difficulty of its enforcement."9  The seasonal-time variation, although mak-
ing no distinction among age groups subject to the curfew, provides for a
later time at which the curfew becomes effective during the summer months
than during the remainder of the year.40 In addition to the fact that the
sun sets at a later hour in the summer months, making it more difficult
to keep children indoors, such a provision is probably motivated by the
thought that during summer vacation juveniles should be treated more
leniently. If, however, during free time a child is more prone to get
involved in an act of delinquency, it would seem that a seasonal-time
variation tends to defeat the purpose of the ordinance. A weekend-time
variation likewise applies the designated time uniformly to all age groups,
but extends the time limit on Friday and Saturday nights.41  The same
criticism advanced with respect to the seasonal-time variation would seem
to be applicable to this variation.
Information gleaned from reporting cities indicates that the provisions
governing both the age groups subject to the curfew and the time at which
it goes into affect are drafted on the basis of uninformed guesses rather
than as a result of investigation into the incidence of criminal activity. The
determination of both age and time limitations by a municipality which
seeks to enact a curfew ordinance should not be an arbitrary matter. The
Model Curfew Ordinance suggested by the National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers leaves time and age variations to municipal discretion.2 It
would seem that each city must first determine which age groups account
for the major portion of juvenile delinquency and, secondly, ascertain
the hours during which nocturnal crime is the greatest. Further, the re-
strictions should not be so severe as to seriously curtail normal and ad-
visable juvenile evening activities. Finally, consideration of the adequacy
of available housing facilities should influence the hour at which children
are required to be indoors.
3. Juvenile Conduct Prohibited
The most significant divergence among the ordinances lies in the con-
duct prohibited. On the basis of the broadest scope of conduct prohibited
39. It is difficult to distinguish on sight between two age groups of children.
Further stratification of children beyond the distinction between those subject to the
curfew and those not subject serves to complicate the identification process, adding
much wasted motion to the task of the police. On the other hand, the distinction
between age groups is essential to the operation of any curfew, and it can be main-
tained that if the curfew can be enforced with respect to one age division, it also can
be enforced where there are several, since at any one hour in the evening there is only
one age differentiation to be made.
40. E.g., Elizabeth, New Jersey (May 15 to Oct. 15, 9:30 p.m.; Oct. 15 to May
15, 9:00 p.m.) ; Jacksonville, Florida (Oct. 1 to April 1, 10:00 p.m.; April 1 to Oct. 1,
11:00 p.m.).
41. E.g., Peoria, Illinois (Sunday through Thursday, 10:00 p.m.; Friday and
Saturday, 12 midnight) ; San Jose, California (Sunday through Thursday, 10:00 p.m.;
Friday and Saturday, 12:30 a.m.).
42. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, MODEL CURFEW ORDi-
NANCE SERVicE §§ 7-401, 7-402 (Rhyne ed. 1952).
CURFEW ORDINANCES
by each of the examined ordinances there appear to be two basic types:
the "presence" type and the "loitering" type. The "presence" type makes
it unlawful for a minor "to be" in any of the restricted areas during curfew
hours.43 The "loitering" type ordinance employs a more flexible restriction
apparently permitting the juvenile more freedom of conduct.44  While the
distinction between these two types of ordinances seems great, in practice
the scope of each might be identical. The writers' experience in Philadel-
phia, which has the "loitering" type ordinance, reveals that the police
enforce the curfew as if it were a "presence" type ordinance, giving it a
broader impact than otherwise might be expected.45 On the other hand,
the extent of the exceptions to the conduct proscribed by the ordinance
may operate to give a "presence" type ordinance a narrower impact than
first would appear.46 Three municipalities provide variations in the con-
duct prohibited according to the age of the child; 47 the ordinance as applied
to younger children prohibits "being" but when applied to older children
prohibits "loitering." The rationale behind such ordinances would seem
to be that a younger child generally has less reason to "be" away from
home late at night. However, if the enforcement experience in these cities
parallels that of Philadelphia, the statutory distinction would appear to be
purely verbal.
4. Prohibited Places
The narrowest form of curfew ordinance is that which prohibits the
child from being or loitering on the "streets" 48 after the curfew hour.
At the other extreme are those ordinances which extend to "public streets,
highways, roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds, or other public grounds, places
of amusement and entertainment, vacant lots or other unsupervised
43. "Presence" type ordinances take various forms. The following are typical:
"unlawful . . . to be" (Camden, New Jersey; Akron, Ohio); "unlawful . . . to
be or remain" (Flint, Michigan; Knoxville, Tennessee); "unlawful . . . to walk,
loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play or be present" (Omaha, Nebraska; Milwaukee,
Wisconsin).
44. "Loitering" type ordinances take various forms. The following are typical:
"unlawful . . . to loiter" (Pasadena, California); "unlawful . . . to loiter or
remain" (Richmond, Virginia); "unlawful . . . to remain" (Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania: the ordinance defines "remain" as "to loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play") ;
"unlawful . . .to loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play" (Columbus, Ohio) ; "unlawful
. . . to be and remain" (Norfolk, Virginia).
45. See text at notes 110-12 infra.
46. See text and notes at notes 58-64 infra. Cf. MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
CURFEW ORDINANCES 1 (1950): "The Model Curfew Ordinance of the National In-
stitute of Municipal Law Officers could be called a 'loitering' type of ordinance but
it is so worded as to actually become a 'presence' type with the exemptions included."
47. Detroit, Michigan (under 12 "to be"; under 17 "to loiter"); Minneapolis,
Minnesota (under 14 "to be"; under 18 "to loiter") ; Seattle, Washington (under 16
"to be"; under 21 "to loiter"). Buffalo, New York employs the novel provision that
"no . . . child . . . shall be allowed to loiter, peddle, or be engaged in any avo-
cation."
48. E.g., San Francisco, California; Buffalo, New York. Cf. Akron, Ohio and
Cleveland, Ohio which apply to "streets and sidewalks."
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places." 49 Between these extremes in language other forms appear, such
as "streets and other public places" 0 or "any street, road, avenue, alley,
park or other public places." 51 Many cities extend curfew coverage to
"places of amusement and entertainment" on the theory that as much harm
may subsequently result from juveniles "hanging-out" in habitual places
of congregationZ2 as will result from their being or loitering outdoors. 3
It would seem, however, that the above distinctions once again are
more verbal than actual. The large majority of the examined ordinances,
after enumerating a specific prohibited location or locations, employ the
general term "other public places."54 Since few of the ordinances define
this term 5 it is probable that police with rigorous enforcement policies
interpret the term as applying to any place, whether enclosed or not, to
which the public is admitted5 6 Such an interpretation would render the
distinction between the ordinances without effect. 57
49. E.g., St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio. Many variations of this form
appear, either adding or deleting terms. The Model Curfew Ordinance of the Na-
tional Institute of Municipal Law Officers also follows this form. The ordinances of
Peoria, Illinois and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania apply to "any public place or estab-
lishment." These terms are defined in both as follows: Public place is "any public
street, highway, road, alley, park, playground, wharf, dock, public building or vacant
lot." Establishment is "any privately owned place of business carried on for a
profit or any place of amusement to which the public is invited."
50. E.g., Tampa, Florida; Knoxville, Tennessee.
51. E.g., Richmond, Virginia. Many variations of this form appear, either adding
or deleting terms.
52. See text and notes at notes 87-90 infra.
53. Under the ordinances which apply primarily to places in the open, the police
are handicapped in not being able to apprehend children found in drugstores, eating
places, bowling alleys, and the like. It then becomes a battle of wits as to whether
the child can get home without being caught.
54. See text and notes at notes 50-51 supra.
55. Cf. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania curfew ordinance which contains an excellent
section on definition of terms used in the ordinance. PHI.ADELPEIA, PENNSYLVANIA,
CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 10-302 (1956). See note 49 mtpra.
56. The confusion arising from the use of the term "public place" would seem
to be particularly acute in those municipalities with ordinances pertaining to "streets
and other public places." See note 50 supra. An examination of judicial interpre-
tatiohs of the term "public place" does not help to clarify the situation. It has been
applied to include a poolroom, Griffin v. State, 15 Ga. App. 552, 83 S.E. 871 (1914) ;
a cafe, Francis v. Town of Falkville, 24 Ala. App. 478, 136 So. 866 (1931) ; and a
hotel, State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). On the other hand, it
has been held not to apply to a saloon, State v. Colgan, 92 N.J.L. 307, 108 Atl. 108
(Sup. Ct. 1919) ; and a store, State v. Bruns, 134 N.J.L. 393, 48 A.2d 577 (Sup. Ct.
1946). In Madison Prod. Co. v. Coler, 242 N.Y. 467, 152 N.E. 264 (1926), it
.was held that a statute which prohibited solicitations in "streets and public places"
did not authorize interference with soliciting in houses, offices and factories. The
problem of interpretation may not be so severe in those municipalities which have
ordinances of the type which apply to "any street, road, avenue, alley, park, or other
public place." In such cases the statutory rule of construction of ejusdem genwris
might more easily be applied: "Where general words follow specific words, in an
enumeration . . . the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those enumerated by the preceding specific words." 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4909 (3d ed. Horrack 1943). By applying the rule to
the ordinance in question the ordinance would not seem to apply to enclosed places.
Cf. Norfolk, Virginia curfew ordinance which after naming ten specific places says
any other public place, whether of like kind or not."
57. In some ordinances a distinction in the nature of the conduct prohibited is
made on the basis of the places to which the curfew extends. For example, Fresno,
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5. Conduct Excepted From the Curfew
All of the ordinances examined contained provisions excepting certain
conduct from the operation of the curfew."8 Some of the more common
exceptions are: 1) a minor accompanied by his parent, or guardian or
other adult person having the legal care, custody or control of such minor; 69
2) a minor engaged in lawful employment; 60 3) a minor on an emergency
errand or on legitimate business directed by his parents, guardian or other
adult person having the legal care, custody or control of such minor; 61
4) a minor returning home from school or church-sponsored activities
when such minor's presence was authorized by his or her parent, guardian,
or other adult person having the legal care, custody or control of such
minor. Many additional exceptions can be found which are not common
to the majority of the ordinancesP In Cleveland, Ohio and Detroit,
Michigan the number of exceptions varies according to the age of the child
involved-the older the child the more exceptions that are available, ap-
parently on the legislative assumption that there are more legitimate
reasons for an older child to be out than exist for a younger child.
The large number of exceptions prevalent in curfew ordinances can
be accounted for in several ways. First is the draftsman's desire to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of due process, since it has been held that
curfew ordinances without reasonable exceptions are so great a restraint
California prohibits "loitering" upon the streets and "being" in places of amusement
or entertainment. See also the Seattle, Washington ordinance which prohibits a
person under 21 from loitering in "any public dance hall, public pool or billiard room
or hall or drinking resort" and a child under 16 "to be abroad in or upon any public
place."
58. Cf. Cleveland, Ohio curfew ordinance which has no exceptions for children
under 12 years of age. Exceptions are provided for children between the ages of 12
and 16.
59. A similar provision appeared in every one of the examined ordinances. Many
municipalities provide further that the child may be accompanied by "any adult person
having the permission from the parent or guardian" (e.g., Akron, Ohio), or "spouse
of such person over twenty-one' (e.g., Long Beach, California), or "is otherwise
properly chaperoned by some adult person" (e.g., Nashville, Tennessee).
60. This is a provision which appeared in virtually all of the examined ordi-
nances. Detroit, Michigan, while having the general exception, prohibits certain
specific types of employment during curfew hours.
61. Although most ordinances contain this exception, few provide means by
which evidence of such permission is obtained (e.g., Columbus, Ohio). Norfolk,
Virginia requires the child to carry a written statement to that effect. Apparently
many smaller municipalities do not require permission for emergency errands. See
MIcHIGAN MuxicInAL LEAGUE, CuREW y ORDINANCES 4 (1950).
62. E.g., Indianapolis, Indiana. While not requiring permission, Sacramento,
California provides an exception if the "minor is returning directly home from a
meeting, entertainment, recreational activity or dance."
63. E.g., "Where a regular program or evening's entertainment shall have com-
menced . . . at 8:30, or prior thereto, and shall have been held over [beyond curfew],
or such person shall have left a . . . social call after [curfew] and such person is
thereafter returning directly to his home . . . not later than 12 o'clock midnight."
(Fresno, California). If the minor is "attending to some urgent business and can
give a satisfactory reason for being away from home" (Phoenix, Arizona). If "there
exists a reasonable necessity" for being out beyond curfew (Minneapolis, Minnesota).
Many small municipalities provide exceptions for prom nights, special school events
and the like. E.g., Albert Lea, Minnesota; Williams, Minnesota.
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on individual freedom as to be unconstitutional.6 4 Second, certain ex-
ceptions are not inconsistent with the general aims of a curfew ordinance,
e.g., little harm is likely to result if the minor is in the company of his
parent, his guardian or a person having legal custody. Third, many of
the exceptions are probably the result of legislative desire to strike a
"fair" balance between effective crime control and freedom of movement,
and also to encourage certain conduct on the part of the youth. The latter
would seem particularly true of the employment, emergency errand and
church and school activity exceptions.
6. Penalties for Curfew Violation
Several of the examined ordinances contain no specific provision for
sanctions against the child who is in one of the proscribed places after the
curfew hour,es preferring to rely upon sanctions against other persons
made responsible for the conduct of the child to enforce the ordinance.
66
These ordinances, nevertheless, do make certain conduct by the child
"unlawful,"7 and in many instances it is probable that the cities have
general fine and penalty ordinances applicable to ordinances in which a
specific penalty is not provided.6 8  Many of the remaining ordinances
contain specific penalty provisions, but a marked divergence in the maximum
sanctions authorized is evident among them. Some permit only fines 09
while others allow fines and imprisonment, °7 the least severe maximum
fine being ten dollars 71 and the most stringent maximum penalty being
$500 fine and six months' imprisonment.72 Coupled with the imposition of
a fine and imprisonment, several cities term violations of the ordinance a
misdemeanor. 73 The final type of ordinance provides that the violating
child may be treated under the state juvenile court statute governing
delinquents.74
64. See text and notes at notes 188-91 infra.
65. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Seattle, Washington.
66. For a discussion of parental responsibility generally see LUDWIG, YOUTH AND
THE LAW 131-67 (1955). See text and notes at notes 76-86 infra.
67. E.g., Denver, Colorado.
68. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 1-109
(1956). The curfew ordinance of Cleveland, Ohio specifically refers to such a general
penalty ordinance.
69. Wichita, Kansas; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia.
70. Columbus, Ohio; Dayton, Ohio; St. Paul, Minnesota.
71. Jacksonville, Florida.
72. Berkeley, California.
73. Corpus Christi, Texas; Omaha, Nebraska; Pasadena, California; Phoenix,
Arizona.
74. Indianapolis, Indiana; St. Paul, Minnesota; Wichita, Kansas. In addition to
providing a general penalty, Flint, Michigan states that "if after investigation . . .
it is found that the child is incorrigible or wilfully absents himself or herself from
home and that the parents are unable to control such child, then a complaint in that
case shall be made by the proper authorities under the juvenile law of the state."
Richmond, Virginia has elaborAte provisions for the investigation of each case.
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In those municipalities that impose no sanction on the child violator,
reliance is placed on the sanctions against parents, who are made legally
responsible. Undoubtedly, the threat of fine or imprisonment in many
instances has the effect of inducing lax parents to control the activities
of their children. In addition, many so-called "good" children will respond
on their own initiative to obey the curfew in order to prevent the em-
barrassment of a public hearing and penalty from being inflicted on their
parents. However, there are children who persist in staying away from
home at night despite parental orders to the contrary. These are the
children who are most likely to engage in the criminal activity that the
curfew seeks to prevent, but against such children a sanction on the parents
is particularly ineffectual. However, granting that some direct remedy is
desirable, the appropriate choice is not obvious. Imposition of a monetary
fine on children lacks merit. Since most of the children subject to the
curfew attend school, they are either unable to pay the fine or would
acquire money to pay the fine from parents or through some act of de-
linquency. Moreover, the mandatory charging of a misdemeanor would
not seem desirable. A curfew violation alone should not merit burdening
a youth with a criminal record for life, since a curfew violation is not
itself indicative of conduct inherently dangerous to society. Perhaps the
best of the available sanctions would be treatment as a juvenile delinquent,
which involves discretionary handling of the juvenile's case by an ap-
propriate state authority designed to cope with juvenile delinquency. 75
7. Parental Responsibility
All but one 6 of the curfew ordinances examined proscribed certain
conduct on the part of parents or guardians, with penalties imposed for
violationY7 The purpose of these provisions is to make parents the pri-
mary agents of curfew enforcement. The most prevalent type of ordinance
is that which makes it unlawful for a parent or guardian to "permit" or
to "permit or allow" a child to violate the curfew provisions. The word
"permit" is imprecise, having been defined in other contexts as express
assent to the doing of an act or acquiescence by failure to prevent the doing
of an act.78  Hence, the ordinances do not reveal whether a parent's lack
of knowledge of the child's violation constitutes a defense. Other munici-
palities are more explicit. Portland, Oregon states that the parent shall
not "permit or by inefficient control allow," while Phoenix, Arizona invokes
a broad meaning to "permit" by providing that "it shall not constitute a
75. For a complete discussion of juvenile delinquency and its treatment, including
the functions of a Juvenile Court, see THE JUvENILE OFFENDER (Vedder ed. 1954).
76. San Jose, California does not provide for parental responsibility.
77. For discussion of parental responsibility see generally LUDWIG, YoUTrx AND
THE LAW 131-67 (1955); Gladstone, The Legal Responsibility of Parents, 21 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 172 (1955); Note, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 34
CHI.-KNrT L. REV. 222 (1956).
78. Tenney v. Enkeball, 62 Ariz. 416, 158 P.2d 519 (1945); Hodges v. Ocean
Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28 (1941) ; A. E. Holly & Co. v.
Simmons, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 124, 85 S.W. 325 (Civ. App. 1905).
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defense that such parent or guardian did not have knowledge." 79 A
second type ordinance is that which provides that the parent shall not
"knowingly" permit a violation on the part of the child.80 This language
appears to remove the doubt in meaning on the issue of knowledge inherent
in the preceding type ordinance. However, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
has interpreted "knowingly permit" as an objective test, meaning the
knowledge which a parent should reasonably be expected to have concern-
ing the whereabouts of his children.8 ' Such a construction materially
diminishes the effect of the knowledge requirement, but it nonetheless
appears to be more consonant with the purposes of imposing parental
responsibility. If the objective of such a provision is to encourage parental
control over the nighttime activities of children, an ordinance which pro-
hibits only knowing conduct does not encompass the neglectful or careless
parent, since the parent always would have the defense that he or she
"didn't know" that the child was not at home, bounded only by the limits
of credulity.
Penalties imposed upon parents for violation of the ordinance are
similar to those imposed upon children. Some municipalities declare the
parental conduct unlawful and then apply a general penalty ordinance.
82
Others specifically provide for penalties ranging up to $500 fines and/or
maximums of six months' imprisonment. s 3 Many of the cities which
provide for specific penalties have a graduated scale of fines dependent
upon the number of violations.8 4 In addition, several ordinances pro-
vide that a parent's violation is a misdemeanor.8 5 In this area, as well
as that concerning penalties imposed upon children, the question should
be raised whether the aims of a curfew could be accomplished with less
severe penalties.8 6
8. Responsibility of Third Persons
The geographical scope of many curfew ordinances extends to places
of amusement and entertainment.8 7 To facilitate enforcement of these
79. Cf. San Francisco, California, which provides that, "Upon violation by a
juvenile . . .a rebuttable presumption arises that the parent or guardian assisted,
aided, abetted and encouraged such minor to violate ... " Detroit, Michigan has
a similar ordinance.
80. Corpus Christi, Texas; Dayton, Ohio.
81. Interview with Raymond Kitty, Assistant City Solicitor, Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, Aug. 22, 1957.
82. Camden, New Jersey; Fresno, California.
83. Berkeley, California; Gary, Indiana. Cf. Buffalo, New York which imposes
a monetary penalty upon the child but makes the parent liable in an action to recover
the penalty owing from the offending child.
84. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania gives the parent a warning on the first violation
and on any violations thereafter provides for fines of $5.00 to $100.00, with imprison-
ment for a maximum of ten days if the fine is not paid promptly. Akron, Ohio pro-
vides for fines of $5.00 to $25.00 for the first violation and fines of $10.00 to $49.00
for every violation thereafter.
85. Duluth, Minnesota; Dayton, Ohio.
86. See text at notes 65-75 supra.
87. See text at notes 49-53 supra.
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provisions five cities 88 place an obligation upon the individual, firm or cor-
poration operating such an establishment to prevent any minor from re-
maining on the premises during the hours of curfew.89 Violating these
provisions results in fines and/or imprisonment. 90 Absent such a provision
a proprietor might harbor the juvenile and encourage violations, not being
concerned with whether the juvenile is acting unlawfully so long as he is
spending money in the establishment. A provision which places a penalty
upon proprietors should operate as an inducement to aid the parents and
police to enforce the curfew, easing the police task of enforcement and
encouraging the juveniles who realize that they will not be permitted to
"hang out" in places of amusement or entertainment during curfew hours
to stay at home.
9. State Curfew Legislation
Oregon is the only state that has specifically enacted a curfew
statute.91 This statute follows the general form of the municipal ordinances
previously discussed. It provides that a child under eighteen years of age
shall not be in or upon the streets, highways, parks, alleys or other public
places between the hours of 12 midnight and 4:00 a.m. It also prohibits
a parent from allowing a violation. On the first violation the child is
taken to juvenile court and is subject to fine or imprisonment, or both.
A violation by a parent is a misdemeanor. The statute further provides
that municipalities also may enact ordinances so long as the effective hours
are at least as restrictive as those in the state statute.
92
Eleven other states have statutes containing provisions which, if
enforced, would have the effect of curfews. 93 These statutes, in defining
juvenile delinquency, include any child who wanders about the streets
88. Peoria, Illinois; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rich-
mond, Virginia; Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
89. Richmond, Virginia places responsibility upon the proprietor, provided there is
conspicuously posted at the entrance of such place of amusement or entertainment a
notice containing the curfew provisions. The efficacy of this proviso is questionable.
It would seem that responsibility may be avoided simply by failing to post a notice,
since there is no provision requiring posting.
90. Cf. the ordinance of Detroit, Michigan which provides that "any person assist-
ing, aiding, abetting, or encouraging" a minor to violate the curfew shall be guilty of
a violation. This would seem to have a broader scope than the ordinances cited in
the text, and would have the same advantages. However, from another standpoint,
the clause is unfortunate in that it is unclear as to what constitutes assisting, aiding,
abetting or encouraging.
91. ORE. Rzv. STAT. §§ 419.710, 419.720, 419.730, 419.740, 419.990 (1953). A cur-
few statute was introduced in the Arizona State legislature in 1955. F. L. MANELLA,
REPORT ON CURFE-W LAW 9 (Fla. Children's Comm'n 1956). Apparently it has not yet
been enacted.
92. The ordinance of Portland, Oregon extends from 9:15 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. and
hence is valid under the statute.
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-204 (1947) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2802 (1949) ; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 16-1803 (Supp. 1957) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 2001 (1958) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. §9-3204(11) (1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:4-14(k) (1957); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 101 (1951) ; S.D. CODE § 43.0301 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-242
(1955) ; VT. REv. STAT. § 9884 (1947) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(17) (1956).
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in the nighttime without being on any lawful business or occupation.94
However, such provisions are of doubtful constitutional validity since they
may be so vague as to deny due process to those persons subject to them.
95
Even if the statutes survive this constitutional impasse, they are subject
to the further policy objection that no provision is made for parental re-
sponsibility. Furthermore, state curfew laws are of questionable efficacy
since the enforcement pattern may reflect the fact that they do not take
into account local factors such as public reaction and the need for the
measure.96 Of the reporting cities in those states having such statutes,
only Fort Wayne, Indiana stated that the statute is enforced as a curfew by
the local authorities. However, it is noteworthy that Indianapolis, Indiana
found the same statute inadequate and enacted a supplementary ordinance. 97
III. CURFEW ORDINANCE IN OPERATION IN PHILADELPHIA
As part of the study of the practical application of curfew ordinances,
observations were made in Philadelphia of the police enforcement, the
prosecutions, and the minor judiciary's dispositions of cases under its ordi-
nance. The information upon which the following discussion is based was
obtained to a large degree from interviews with officials and members of
the Philadelphia Police Department, from their records and from personal
observation.
9 8
To properly analyze the administration of the curfew, it must be
examined against the background of the local procedure established to
administer juvenile criminal matters generally. Philadelphia's juvenile
criminal procedures, encompassing the activities of those under eighteen
years of age, are segregated from its adult criminal procedures. 99 A special
division of the police force, the Juvenile Aid Bureau, is charged with the
responsibility of enforcing criminal laws against juveniles, including the
detection and apprehension of violators. While any regular police officer
can detain and hold a juvenile, only a member of the Juvenile Aid Bureau
94. Houston, Texas enforces as a curfew a statute which states "[A]ny peace
officer or probation officer shall have the right to take into custody any child who
is . . . reasonably believed to be a fugitive from his parents or from justice, or
whose surroundings are such as to endanger his health, welfare or morals." TEx.
REv. C-9. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 11 (1950).
95. See note 34 snipra.
96. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL AsSOCIATION, INFORMATION MEMORANDUI No. 48-2-
CURFEW ORDINANCES (March 19, 1948). "[1]n no event should [a curfew] be enacted
unless considerable sentiment in favor is found to exist among . . . the community.
97. The Indiana juvenile court had construed the state statute prohibiting "wan-
dering" by a juvenile as not including being in an automobile. The Indianapolis
curfew specifically covers "being in" vehicles.
98. Because of the confidential nature of many of these sources, in most cases it
has been necessary to omit the names of the persons involved.
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 694(b) (1930) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (Supp.
1957). For an excellent statement of Philadelphia procedures for dealing with juve-
nile crime see MUNICIPAL COURT OF PHILADELPHIA, REPORT 13-15 (1954).
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can make what is termed in Philadelphia police statistics as an "arrest." 10
A juvenile held by a regular police officer is turned over to a Juvenile Aid
Bureau officer who determines whether the detained juvenile should be
"arrested." If not, the juvenile is released and a "non-arrest" is recorded
by the officer.1 1 If, however, the juvenile is arrested he is put into the
custody of the Youth Study Center.102  Within one day an informal hear-
ing is held, the legal function of which roughly approximates that per-
formed by a magistrate's court with regard to adult criminal matters, i.e.,
the determination of whether there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the juvenile committed the act for which he was arrested. Arrests
for minor delinquencies may be adjusted at the informal hearing. If the
charge is more severe, requiring further investigation and judicial disposi-
tion at a formal hearing, the case is listed for the juvenile division of the
municipal court.'03 However, in cases of murder and other heinous
crimes the case trial is in the county criminal court.10 4 The municipal
court, in addition to having jurisdiction over proceedings affecting de-
linquent children, retains jurisdiction over adults charged with acting in
violation of state and local laws with respect to children.10 5
A. Patterns of Police Enforcement
In contrast with the procedure for handling instances of juvenile de-
linquency, the curfew ordinance is enforced in much the same manner as
are municipal traffic laws. The Philadelphia curfew ordinance makes it
unlawful for a child under seventeen to remain in certain designated places
after the curfew hour,1 6 but no sanction is specified in the ordinance
against the child.' 0 7 Sanctions are prescribed for parents who knowingly
permit their children to violate the ordinance after having received notice
of a prior violation by the child.' s Under this ordinance primary re-
sponsibility for detection and enforcement falls on the regular police force,
since the staff of the Juvenile Aid Bureau is inadequate to perform the
100. See text at notes 110-12 infra.
101. The Juvenile Aid Bureau officers have broad discretion in determining
whether the juvenileds detention shall be recorded as an "arrest" or "non-arrest." To
the extent that this discretion is not uniformly exercised juvenile criminal statistics
are inaccurate criteria of the incidence of juvenile criminal activity. See text and
notes at notes 173-78 infra.
102. The Youth Study Center of the juvenile division of the municipal court
is an institution for the reception of juveniles whose cases are under judicial investi-
gation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 441 (Supp. 1957).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §694(b) (1930); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §244
(Supp. 1957).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 694 (1930).
105. PA. STAT. ANr. tit. 11, § 244 (Supp. 1957).
106. PHILA4.DEHrA, PENNs LVAmA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 10-303 (1956).
107. Id. § 10-306(1).
108. Id. §§ 10-304, 10-306(2).
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task.109 Notice of a violation is sent to the parent. Upon a second viola-
tion, a summons is served on the parent and a hearing is held in the
magistrate's court, at which time the parents' penalty under the ordinance
may be imposed.
1. Detection of Violations
If a police officer sees a person who appears to be under-age, the police-
man generally stops the juvenile and questions him. The ordinance pro-
vides that at this juncture the officer is to obtain the name, age and address
of the child as well as the name of the parent or parents, and then to
instruct the juvenile to proceed to his home."
10 Although the prescribed
procedure is followed in many instances, other variant procedures have
been employed by the contacting officers. On many occasions the police
officer will merely direct the child to go home without recording any of
the information called for by the ordinance, thus frustrating the attempt
of the curfew law to impose responsibility on the parents for the conduct
of their children. On other occasions the contacting police officer will
record the required information and then personally escort the child to
his home."' A third variation, of questionable propriety, is that of pick-
ing up the child and taking him to the station-house, to be released only
when the parent personally appears. According to the police, aside from
instances of lost or runaway children, this procedure is employed either
when the contacting officer believes that the child is giving misinformation
in response to the officer's inquiries, or when the contact is made as a
result of a complaint to the police department, or when the juvenile is
contacted on suspicion of having been involved in some criminal act. In
the latter two situations the Juvenile Aid Bureau officer in the district is
notified and assumes jurisdiction. He then directs that an "arrest" or
"non-arrest" be recorded, depending upon the likelihood of the child's
having committed an act of delinquency. In no event is an "arrest" re-
corded where the child's sole infraction is curfew violation. In the first
situation, where the child is suspected of giving misinformation to the
contacting officer, the Juvenile Aid Bureau officer is notified only if further
questioning indicates that the activity in which the child was engaged at
the time of the contact was such as might require further investigation
or detention. Otherwise, the child is released to his parents upon their
arrival at the police station with no recordation of an "arrest" by the
109. At the end of 1957 there were 210 employees in the Juvenile Aid Bureau, a
force scarcely large enough on a three shift basis to effectively police a city with
more than 300,000 juveniles between the ages of seven and seventeen. Interview with
Inspector Harry J. Fox, July 30, 1957. Currently, fifty more police officers have been
added to the Juvenile Aid Bureau, bringing its total force to 260.
110. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 10-306 (1956).
111. It is not unlikely that children substantially below the curfew age limit who
are away from home late in the evening are either lost or running away from home,
in which case the police, apart from curfew enforcement, should take the child into
protective custody and attempt to locate his parents.
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police department. Detention by the police is an arrest," 2 regardless of
the terminology employed by them in reporting case disposition. In general,
under the common law an arrest could legally be made without a warrant
whenever the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the
person to be apprehended has committed a crime.113 Detention of children
contacted by the police can be justified, apart from the curfew law, under
the general law by the theory that the arresting officer had reason to
believe that the juvenile had committed an act of delinquency., 4  How-
ever, where the detention is effected solely because the contacting officer
suspects that the child is giving misinformation in response to his inquiries,
i.e., where no act of delinquency is charged, legal justification appears to
be wanting. Misinforming the police is not a crime in itself. Since no
sanction is provided against the curfew violator in that ordinance, arrest
for curfew violation would seem purposeless and not provide legal justifi-
cation for the detention."I5 Although the language of the statute defining
"juvenile delinquency" is sufficiently broad to include a curfew violation,
no case has yet so held, nor do the police appear to consider curfew viola-
tion an act of delinquency under the ordinance. On the other hand, if
strict legality were to be honored, brash children could make effective
enforcement of the curfew impossible. Children under seventeen rarely
carry identification on their persons. Unless the police should personally
escort every offender to his home, which would be an intolerable burden
on the force, the parents would remain unknown, leaving the curfew a
law without a sanction.
2. Extent of the Enforcement
Enforcement of the Philadelphia curfew ordinance began on February
1, 1955.116 Since that date the number of reported curfew violations on
112. 1 Ai.EXANDER, THE LA-w OF ARREST 353-61 (1949). See Foote, Safeguards
in thw Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 16, 36-44 (1957) ; Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
1182, 1185-88 (1952).
113. See 1 ALEXANDER, op. cit. suPra note 112, at 364-68, 441, 451-57.
114. There may be serious question as to whether an arrest without a warrant
for an act of delinquency, being neither felony nor misdemeanor, is valid under these
circumstances. For the purposes of analyzing the legality of such an arrest under
the curfew ordinance alone, however, this problem need not be decided.
The statute defines a delinquent child as "(a) A child who has violated any law
of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any city, borough or township; (b) A child
who, by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient, is uncontrolled by his or
her parent, guardian, or custodian or legal representative; (c) A child who is habitu-
ally truant from school or home; (d) A child who habitually so deports himself or
herself as to endanger the morals or health of himself, herself or others." PA. STAT.
Amy. tit. 11, §243(4)(a)-(d) (1939).
115. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 10-306(1)
(1956). But see PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, § 13349 (1957), authorizing "[A] ny police
officer . . . upon view of the breach of any ordinance of any city of the first class
• . . to forthwith arrest the person or persons so offending, without any process
." and to take the offending person to a magistrate to fix a time for a hearing.
bid. But under the curfew, there can be no hearing, as there is no sanction against
an offending juvenile. See text and note at note 107 supra.
116. Interview with Inspector Harry J. Fox, July 1, 1957.
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the part of juveniles has been increasing steadily. In the eleven months
of 1955, 2,051 violations were reported; during the twelve months of
1956, 2,990 violations were reported; 1957 witnessed 6,973 curfew viola-
tions.1 7  On the basis of the average number of violations per month
during each of the three years of its enforcement the figures reveal that
in 1955 there were 186.5 violations per month, in 1956 there were 249.2
violations per month (an increase of 33.6 per cent over 1955) and in 1957
there were 581.1 violations per month (an increase of 133.2 per cent over
1956 and 210.9 per cent over 1955).
Despite the over-all increase in the incidence of curfew violations,
attributable to an accelerated effort on the part of the districts to enforce
the curfew, examination of statistics of reported violations by police district
reveals a singularly irregular pattern of enforcement. Comparison by dis-
trict on the basis of the number of violations occurring within each district
per thousand juveniles aged seven to seventeen residing within the district ns
reveals that those districts with the heaviest rate of juvenile crime, as
117. Unless otherwise specified all curfew, arrest and non-arrest statistics, except
those reported in the section on judicial administration, were taken from the records
of the Juvenile Aid Bureau.
118. Source of the juvenile population statistics is the CRImE PRVENT N Asso-
cIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, REPORT (1955). The Crime Prevention Association based
its determination on estimates taken from the 1950 census.
POLICE CONTACTS (BY DISTRICT OF CONTACT) PER THOUSAND JUVENILES, AGES 7-17,
RESIDING WITHIN THE DIsRICT
Non-Arrest Arrest Curfew
District 1955 1956 1957 1955 1956 1957 1955 1956 1957
5 32.8 35.9 31.0 15.8 13.5 12.1 14.7 20.2 20.2
6 75.7 62.8 68.9 103.3 122.8 101.4 10.7 15.7 29.6
9 115.7 91.0 71.9 65.9 102.3 102.8 15.8 17.6 24.4
14 37.1 33.6 31.5 19.0 24.1 19.8 4.1 6.3 18.0
16 79.0 62.0 60.2 63.8 54.9 54.8 17.9 18.2 40.9
17 44.0 49.4 54.1 33.2 49.9 37.3 5.6 7.2 55.2
19 100.4 88.3 92.6 75.8 114.5 166.1 28.2 29.9 41.4
23 82.2 71.5 54.0 56.4 65.7 59.4 9.3 10.4 9.8
24 36.9 34.3 29.6 13.6 13.8 17.3 9.8 11.6 16.5
26 47.4 38.0 50.4 25.5 28.0 35.4 5.2 3.6 9.5
29 31.1 30.9 27.7 17.4 21.7 15.3 2.4 3.0 15.2
30 39.3 33.1 40.9 16.8 26.8 25.0 4.5 6.0 18.4
31 66.6 62.4 47.5 37.5 61.9 45.6 7.3 10.8 31.5
32 28.4 32.3 36.7 14.0 16.2 17.1 2.9 3.9 14.7
33 41.6 37.8 35.5 20.8 34.9 27.8 6.4 11.3 27.8
35 26.8 44.2 24.3 7.5 9.0 7.2 10.6 32.6 38.3
37 43.5 39.3 36.0 17.4 22.0 19.5 4.5 5.5 32.9
38 41.2 40.1 48.9 22.1 29.5 35.3 5.6 4.7 24.0
39 49.7 48.0 46.3 29.2 52.9 33.0 6.0 6.4 10.9
41 43.6 34.0 28.7 25.2 29.1 20.4 5.8 6.1 10.7.
2,7, 15 (27) * 26.4 31.1 24.8 15.7 15.2 12.7 5.3 8.0 22.2
City Average 45.5 44.3 41.0 27.1 34.9 30.7 7.0 10.2 23.7
* Due to changes within the three year period in the geographical boundaries of three
of the police districts and the termination of the 27th district and the establishment of
the 7th district within this period, the figures for these districts have been combined.
All the affected districts lie in the same section of the city.
The eight districts in which substantial effort to enforce the curfew was noted
in 1955 were chosen on the basis of a curfew rate of nine, a number chosen for its
convenience rather than its independent significance. On this basis substantial en-
forcement was noted in the 5th, 6th, 9th, 16th, 23d, 24th and 35th districts.
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measured by the incidence of the juvenile arrests, tended in 1957 to have
higher curfew violation rates." 9 This generalization indicates that these
areas may have a greater proportion of juveniles on the streets after the
curfew hour than do areas with less juvenile criminal activity. Yet in a
few districts where the arrest rate is significantly higher than average, the
curfew violation rate is considerably lower than average, 2 0 and in a few
districts where the arrest rate is markedly lower than average, the curfew
violation rate exceeds the average.12 ' Some variation may be attributable
to the fact that there are more restaurants, places of amusement and other
gathering places in certain districts with high curfew violation rates than
exist in other districts. Variation may also be due, in part, to improper
distribution of police personnel among the districts. The conclusion, how-
ever, is suggested that the extent of curfew enforcement is in large part de-
termined by the attitude of the district captains and their subordinates
toward the utility of the curfew as an effective crime combatant.
3. Enforcement Against Groups of Juveniles
Of primary concern to the Philadelphia police department in its efforts
to curb juvenile crime is the prevention of the accumulations of juveniles
in groups where the likelihood of illegal activity is thought to be greater
than among persons acting individually.122  As a consequence, patrolling
police officers often do not bother to stop individuals after the curfew
hour who, although apparently in the age group subject to the curfew, are
alone and appear to be headed for a destination as opposed to lounging
on a street corner. On the other hand, whenever a group of more than
two juveniles is spotted, the police almost invariably stop the children
regardless of whether the group appears to be headed for a destination.23
In order to prevent group accumulations, the police periodically check
places of habitual congregation, and upon finding a group of juveniles, use
their authority under the curfew ordinance to disperse them. Whether
the police consider that the curfew has given them new authority in this
regard is questionable. Even before its enactment the police did not hesi-
tate to act whenever a group of juveniles or adults became boisterous on
the streets or congregated in large numbers about any eating place or like
119. E.g., the 6th, 9th, 16th, 17th, 19th and 31st districts. See note 118 supra.
120. The 23d and 26th districts. See note 118 supra.
121. The 35th and 37th districts. See note 118 supra.
122. The greater likelihood of group activities culminating in criminal conduct
than can be expected from individual activity is an untested assumption, although
police apparently rely on its truth. The idea that group conduct is more dangerous
than individual action is reflected in one context by criminal conspiracy statutes. See
MILLR', CRimINAL LAw 110-11 (1934).
123. The Philadelphia curfew ordinance prohibits "remaining," defined generally
as loitering, and does not reach merely "being" in the proscribed places. PHILADEL-
PHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 10-302(1) (g), 10-303(1) (1956).
Nevertheless, the police do not consistently make this distinction in enforcement,
thrusting the task on the minor judiciary for determination when the case comes on for
hearing. See text and notes at notes 110-12 supra.
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establishment in the evening.' 2 4 The ordinance, however, has bestowed
significant new power on the police by authorizing them to enter drug
stores, restaurants and places of amusement and order juveniles to leave,
even though they are not engaged in any unlawful activity at the time. 25
This power is augmented under the curfew by the provisions for the im-
position of a fine upon proprietors who permit juveniles to remain in their
establishments after the curfew hour.
126
In conjunction with enforcement of the curfew against groups of
juveniles, there is an absence of uniformity in the treatment given to civic,
school or religious functions. No exception is provided in the ordinance
for any of these activities, yet the announced policy of the police department
is that children returning home from such activities will not be reported
as curfew violators, if the district police captain is notified of the function
by the sponsoring organization.1' However, in at least one instance a
district captain reported that he would recognize no exception other than
those enumerated in the ordinance. His district has had one of the lowest
arrest rates in the city, both prior and subsequent to the enactment of the
curfew. The rate of curfew violations in his district ranks as one of the
highest in the city. This is probably attributable to his personal attitude
toward enforcement as evidenced by his stand on the unwritten exception.
4. Harassment of Individuals
No instances were noted in which the curfew was used discriminatorily
to detain or harass certain identified persons or groups of persons. Some
police control devices are susceptible of use to harass or detain persons
deemed "undesirable" or "suspicious" by local law enforcement officials.
12 8
This is particularly true when the ordinance or statute is applicable to
a relatively small portion of the population and is sporadically enforced.129
In contrast, the curfew is not narrowly limited in its application; and
enforcement can fairly be described as intensive, with the result that few
persons, if any, can legitimately complain that the curfew in Philadelphia
is a tool to maintain police surveillance over them as opposed to the juvenile
population in general. Moreover, there is little need on the part of the
police department to employ the curfew for such purposes. If the police
determine that a specific juvenile or group of juveniles is suspected of
124. See Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 1182, 1201-06 (1952).
125. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 10-302(1) (a),
10-303(1) (1956).
126. Id. §§ 10-305, 10-306(3).
127. Interview with Inspector Harry J. Fox, July 30, 1957.
128. Typical of these devices is a criminal registration ordinance. See Note,
Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U.
PA. L. REv. 60, 91-94, 102-05 (1954). See also Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 615-33 (1956) ; Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type
Laws for the Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950).
129. Ibid.
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criminal activity, there are sufficient other means of apprehension without
having to rely on a curfew violation. 130 Past experience indicates that
the police hold no compunctions about detaining a person without being
able to charge him with a specific offense.13' Since the range of "de-
linquent" acts is so broad, it would seem that police practice in arresting
juveniles is at least questionable.
132
B. Judicial Administration
The Philadelphia curfew ordinance provides no sanction against the
juvenile curfew violator, regardless of the number of curfew violations
that the juvenile may have amassed.1m Parents who "knowingly permit"
a second violation by juveniles for whom they are responsible after re-
ceiving notice of a prior violation are subject to a minimum fine of five
dollars and a maximum fine of $100.134 Proprietors are subject to a fine
of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than $300 for knowingly
permitting juveniles to remain in their establishments after the curfew
hour. 35 The magistrates hear and decide all cases of individuals charged
with violations.'" At the inception of the curfew all cases were brought
before the local magistrate sitting in the area of the violator's residence.'37
However, after a relatively short period this system proved unsatisfactory
and unpopular with the magistrates. Magistrates, elected to office, were
130. See text and notes at notes 112-15 supra.
131. Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L.
REv. 1182, 1188-1206 (1952). See also Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Adminis-
tration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956).
132. See note 114 supra.
133. PHILADELPHIA, PmxxsYLvAxIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 10-306(1)
(1956).
134. Id. §§ 10-304, 10-306(2). The former section specifies unlawful conduct of
parents; the latter specifies the penalties. Viewing the two sections together raises
an apparent ambiguity. Section 10-304 makes it unlawful for a parent to "knowingly
permit any minor to remain in or upon any public place or any establishment . . .'
during the prescribed hours. Section 10-306(2) provides that "any parent who shall
violate any provision of § 10-304 after having received notice of a prior violation shall
be fined. . . ." It is not clear from the language in the ordinance whether the "prior
violation" refers to a violation by the child or by a parent. If the latter, the police
would then be in the difficult position of having to determine whether the parent
knowingly permitted the child's initial violation. However, since the purpose of the
act is to encourage parents to control their children after the child's initial violation,
it would not seem necessary to require that such violation was knowingly permitted.
135. Id. §§ 10-305, 10-306(3).
136. There is no provision in the ordinance expressly providing which court shall
have jurisdiction over cases involving violators. However, by statute magistrates
have power to "hear and determine all actions of debt for penalty for the breach of
any ordinance. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 291, 1058 (1930). The argument
can be made that jurisdiction should be in the juvenile court of Philadelphia, which
is the municipal court of Philadelphia. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §243(1) (1930).
The juvenile court of Philadelphia has "full and exclusive jurisdiction in all pro-
ceedings affecting . . . delinquent . . . children . . . and of all cases of adults
• . .charged with any act of omission or commission with respect to any child,
which act of omission or commission is a violation of any State law or ordinance of
any city. . . ." Id. §244 (Supp. 1957).
137. Interview with Raymond Kitty, Assistant City Solicitor, Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, Aug. 22, 1957.
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reluctant to antagonize their constituents over what seemed a trivial
matter. 'As a result many curfew cases were summarily dismissed. It
has been reported to the writers that such dispositions resulted even in
those cases in which evidence was presented by the City Solicitor clearly
indicating violations of the ordinance. Presently, all curfew violation cases
in the entire city are heard by one magistrate, a zealous curfew advocate
who asserts that his political fortunes will not be allowed to interfere with
the performance of his duties.
188
1. Procedures in the Magistrate's Court
A discussion of the procedure followed in the magistrate's court pre-
ceeds an examination of that court's disposition of those cases. The pro-
ceedings are commenced by calling the names of the persons charged with
violating the ordinance. They step to the bar, but are rarely sworn, al-
though even in the magistrate's courts it is statutorily required that wit-
nesses and parties be sworn.189 In most instances the violating children
attend the hearing although they are not compelled to do so. The current
presiding magistrate encourages their attendance because he believes that
the lecture which he delivers to them in most cases may do as much good
as fining the parents.14° The alleged violations by the juveniles are read
to the magistrate by an officer of the Juvenile Aid Bureau from the Bureau's
copy of the child's police record. Although the evidence is undoubtedly
hearsay,' 41 since the hearings are not before a jury and the records can
fairly be deemed reliable, this technical defect is not serious. The im-
practical alternative would be to require the apprehending officer to per-
sonally appear and relate the same information that is read from the record,
placing an unnecessary burden on an already overworked police force.142
138. Also contributing to the reluctance of the magistrates to hear curfew cases
is that the hearings are held at an inconvenient hour in the evening.
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 251 (1930). There is no requirement that a steno-
graphic record of the prceedings be kept. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 42, §§ 1111, 1137 (Supp.
1957).
140. The prceedings are informal, and often as a result of the magistrate's remarks
they lack the dignity expected to attend judicial proceedings. Thus, when the mother
of a child with a long arrest record could not attend the hearing because she was ill
the magistrate remarked, "If I had a boy like you I'd be sick too." To a boy with
ten arrests the judge said, "Sonny, you win the gold cup for tonight." To another,
"If she'd bang you along the mouth once in a while, you'd be all right !" And to
another, "You crazy or something?"
The magistrate constantly uses the threat technique with both children and their
parents. Although he does not have the authority to commit juveniles to an institu-
tion, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (Supp. 1957), he often threatens to "put him away"
the next time he violates the curfew. Lacking jurisdiction over juveniles, the magis-
trate could recommend to the Juvenile Aid Bureau that the child be brought before
the juvenile court as a delinquent for having violated the curfew. There is no record
of any such recommendation ever having been made, nor is there any record of the
Juvenile Aid Bureau having taken such action on its own initiative.
141. See McCoRmIcK, EviDENcE §§ 281, 283 (1954).
142. The doctrine has been asserted that the rules of evidence are inapplicable to
magistrate's hearings. ORFrELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROm ARREST TO APPEAL 88
(1947). However, it is not clear whether a distinction is made between the dual
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On the other hand, a significant defect noted in the conduct of the
hearings is that parents are adjudged guilty and sanctions imposed without
proof by the city of all the elements necessary to establish guilt and ap-
parently without giving fair consideration to the evidence of statutory
defenses introduced by the defendants. For example, the ordinance sub-
jects to fine only those parents who have received notice of a prior violation
by the child.'4 Yet in none of the cases observed'44 did the prosecution
introduce any evidence of prior notification. 45 The fact that a previous
violation was committed is no indication that the parent was informed of
it. Although the ordinance directs the Juvenile Aid Bureau to notify the
parents of every violation,146 there is evidence that the requirement is not
fully performed: of the 6,973 curfew violations reported in 1957 the Bureau
claims to have sent notices to parents in only 6,143 instances. 147 It would
seem incumbent upon the magistrate to discharge those cases in which
proof of this requisite element of the offense is not made. 4 8 Not only is
it legally demanded of the magistrate, whose responsibility in these cases
is accentuated by the fact that most defendants are unrepresented by counsel,
but his failure to enforce the notice requirement tends to frustrate the
parental responsibility provision of the ordinance. Parents are not to be
penalized but to be encouraged to control the conduct of their children,
which encouragement the City Council intended should first be attempted
by way of a warning notice. A real threat of dismissal by the magistrate
for failure to prove notice would operate to insure official conformity with
the directives of the ordinance.
As for the defenses available under the law, a parent might attempt
to prove that the child did not "loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play" in a
functions performed by a magistrate: (1) to determine whether there are reasonable
grounds for holding an arrested person for further proceedings, and (2) to determine
guilt or innocence in those cases in which he has summary jurisdiction. As a practical
matter, insistence on strict adherence to the rules of evidence would be incapable of
implementation since only two of Philadelphia's twenty-eight magistrates are attor-
neys. See Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia, 106
U. PA. L. Ray. 589, 592-93 (1958).
143. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CoDE oF GEN. OwIrNANcEs §§ 10-304, 10-306
(2) (1956).
144. During the months of July, August and September 1957, over 100 cases were
personally observed.
145. The few cases in which evidence of notice did appear were those in which the
information was volunteered by the defendants.
146. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CoDE op GEN. ORn iNAcEs § 10-306(1)
(1956).
147. To some extent the failure to send notice can be attributed to the fact that a
number of the juveniles reported as curfew violators do not reside within Philadelphia.
Of the 2,051 violations in 1955, children residing other than in Philadelphia accounted
for 94. In 1956, 161 of the 2,990 curfew violations were committed by non-residents.
Nonetheless, the statistics indicate that a significant number of curfew violations by
juveniles resident in Philadelphia are not reported to parents.
148. Proof of notice would not impose an onerous burden on the city. The simple
expedient of sending notice by registered mail with "return receipt requested" would
resolve the administrative problem of the police and settle the issue before the magis-
trate.
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public place or establishment after the curfew hour 149 but was proceeding
towards a specific destination, or that the parent did not "knowingly per-
mit" the child's second violation, 150 or that the child's activities were within
one of the express exceptions, e.g., that he was engaged in an errand "or
other legitimate business" at the parent's behest.1' 1 The contacting officer
is not present to testify to the facts which he observed, and no inference
as to the juvenile's activities may properly be drawn from the bare fact
of his report, since, as previously discussed, 15 2 the police indiscriminately
report children discovered on the streets after-hours without consideration
of whether the alleged violator was "remaining" (loitering) or "being"
outdoors, or of the children's explanations for their presence. Thus the
defendant's or the child's explanation of the fact circumstances is opposed
by no other evidence and subject only to a determination of their credibility
by the magistrate. None would contend that efficient enforcement of the
ordinance could be achieved by the magistrate's giving conclusive effect to
the undisputed testimony of everyone of these interested parties, but the
impression which the writers received was that no genuine consideration
was given to them at all, defendants and witnesses often being silenced
before they had an adequate opportunity to complete their presentation.
Even the City Solicitor's occasional recommendation that a defense be
sustained is usually disregarded. To the writers' experience, the only
contention that has been successfully maintained by parents is that the
juvenile was over-age at the time of apprehension.
Whatever the magistrate's mental decisional processes on the question
of credibility, judgment ought not to be rendered before defendants have
had an opportunity at least to appear to be heard, and it certainly would
be a happier result if greater patience and consideration were expended
in an attempt to more realistically carry out the directions of the ordinance.
Not only does apparent disregard of the express legislative delimitation of
the conduct prohibited, particularly the exceptions permitted and the defini-
tion of "remaining" in a public place or establishment, lead to popular
resentment of the curfew, but it may well be crucial to the issue of its
constitutionality.'-53
2. Case Disposition
Proprietors' liability has been invoked only once since the inception
of the curfew, that fine being for twenty-five dollars. During the period
from December 6, 1956 (when a single magistrate began to hear all cases),
149. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 10-302(1) (g),
10-303(1) (1956).
150. Id. §10-304(1).
151. Id. §10-303(2).
152. See text at notes 110-12 supra.
153. See text and notes at notes 180-91 infra.
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to July 11, 1957, 190 cases of parental liability were heard. 15 4 Thirty-seven
of these cases were discharged; in eighty-one, court costs only were im-
posed; in seventy, fines plus costs were levied; and two cases were con-
tinued.0 5
Of the thirty-seven cases discharged, in seven there was no explanation
for their disposition recorded. Twelve were discharged on the ground
that the parents had moved, and four were on the ground of no service of
process.156 Only one of the thirty-seven cases was discharged on a finding
that there had been no violation on the part of the parent. In that case
the juvenile was over the age limit at the time of his alleged second viola-
tion. The disposition of all but two '17 of the remaining thirteen cases in
the "discharged" category indicates that the magistrate tends not to impose
penalties upon parents when he believes that such action will not effectuate
the purpose of the parental responsibility provisions of the ordinance, i.e.,
induce parents to control their children. In eight of these cases the juvenile
violators were incarcerated in a correctional institution at the time of the
hearing; in two cases the juveniles were in the armed service; and in one
case the violator had been married prior to the hearing. Although this
exercise of discretion may be theoretically justifiable, it is legally inde-
fensible in the view of the plain prescription of the ordinance that a penalty
is to be imposed in all cases where the necessary proof has been established
regardless of the probable lack of deterrent effect on the parents.
15
8
Furthermore, it may be argued that even in the case of those children
who have strayed so far from the paths of proper conduct as to become
subject to personal sanctions imposed by the state juvenile criminal law,
a fine levied on the parents may tend to impress them with their own
responsibilities in the matter, encouraging them to greater control over
154. This sample of 190 cases must be distinguished from those cases, previously
discussed, which were personally observed by the writers. The information regarding
these 190 cases was gathered from the records of the City Solicitor of Philadelphia.
155. Judicial Disposition of Alleged Curfew Violations by Parents-
December 6, 1956 Through July 11, 1957
Disposition of The Child's Number
Parent of Violations Total
2 More Than 2
1) Discharged 27 10 37
2) Costs Only 63 18 81
3) Fine & Costs 39 31 70
(a) $ 5 & Costs (a)25 (a)13 (38)
(b) $10 & Costs (b) 5 (b) 8 (13)
(c) $25 & Costs (c) 8 (c) 9 (17)
(d) Other Amounts (d) 1 (d) 1 ( 2)
4) Continued 2 0 2
Total 131 59 190
156. The extent to which the former category encompasses the latter could not
be determined. It is probable that in at least some of the twelve instances categorized
as "moved," the fact was uncovered on the constable's return of process unsatisfied.
157. In one of these cases the parent was hospitalized, and in the other the juvenile
no longer lived with his parents but resided with foster parents.
158. PHH.ADELPErA, PENSYLVANIA, CODE OF Gmr. ORDINANcEs § 10-306(2)
(1956).
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their offspring when they are released from the correctional institutions.
There is no reason to believe that incarceration indicates incorrigibility or
inability on the part of the parent to control.
One hundred fifty-one of the 190 cases resulted in the imposition of
some sanction.1 9 In eighty-one cases of this group (53.7 per cent), costs
only were imposed. 1 0 Although the magistrate is permitted to exercise
discretion within the limits prescribed by the ordinance in fixing the amount
of fine, there is no authority for failure to impose at least the minimum
fine on a finding of guilty. Since violation on the part of the parent was
expressly found in each of these cases, it would seem that the magistrate
had no legal choice but to impose the minimum fine rather than assess costs
only.161 Of the remaining seventy cases in which fines were levied in
addition to payment of court costs, thirty-eight were fines of $5, thirteen
were fines of $10, seventeen were fines of $25, one was $50, and one $2.50.162
The variations in penalties meted out may be attributed to several
considerations. First, some of the cases were not heard until after more
than two violations had been reported against the juvenile.'le  Second, in
the event of a parent's second hearing (in which case the child must have
accumulated at least three curfew violations) the magistrate invariably im-
posed a fine in addition to costs, with the fines tending generally to be more
severe than for those parents having a first hearing after their child's
third violation.'" Other considerations affecting the determination of the
penalty to be imposed include the attitude of the parent and the juvenile
at the hearing, the existence and extent of the child's prior police record
(of which curfew violations are a part), and the magistrate's general esti-
mate of whether the parents could control the conduct of their child; i.e.,
159. See note 155 supra.
160. In two of these cases, the juvenile was in a correctional institution at the
time of the hearing. Imposition of a sanction in this situation does not appear to be
present practice, however. The following eight cases in which the curfew violator
was incarcerated at the time of hearing resulted in discharge. See text below note
157 supra.
161. In a few of the cases personally observed, hence not within the sample under
immediate discussion, the magistrate imposed costs on the parents even though no
violations were found. Under earlier Pennsylvania law all cases of summary con-
victions in which the evidence was not sufficient to convict and the action was dis-
missed, costs were paid by the county. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 211 (1930). How-
ever, this statute was repealed by two later acts: (1) The Minor Judiciary Fee Bill,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 216-21 (Supp. 1957) (applicable to all cities except those
of the first class, and providing for the payment of costs by the county in the event
of a dismissal) ; and (2) Magistrates Fee Bill of Cities of the First Class, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, §§ 231-35 (Supp. 1957) (contains no provision for the payment of any
costs by the county). Since Philadelphia is a city of the first class, the practice of
imposing costs on dismissed parties in curfew cases seems to be within the statute.
However, it is questionable whether this practice would satisfy the requisites of con-
stitutional due process of law.
162. In view of the minimum fine of $5 prescribed in the ordinance, see text at
note 134 supra, the imposition of a fine of a lesser amount is improper.
163. See note 155 supra.
164. Of the 190 cases in the sample, eight involved parents who had had a prior
hearing for violation of the ordinance. These cases were disposed of as follows: three
discharged, one fine of $5 plus costs and four fines of $25 plus costs.
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whether a fine would be useless. While all these factors contribute to the
choice of sanction, it is the writers' impression that in most of the cases
in which costs only were assessed, the action is the result of the magistrate's
ad hoc determination that even though the juvenile is a curfew violator,
he or she is not likely to engage in criminal activity. Since it cannot be
denied that the curfew does capture a large number of juveniles who would
otherwise not be involved with the police, there is little issue that can be
taken with the magistrate's basis for the exercise of his discretion, provided
he exercises that discretion within the confines prescribed in the ordinance.
Although many of the deficiencies in the administration of the Phila-
delphia curfew ordinance which emerge from the above discussion are
identical with those that exist in any summary trial or hearing, others are
peculiar to this problem and subject to cure. More specifically, the only
devices available to the magistrate in effecting the purpose of the ordinance
are the fine and the public lecture. In many cases these may be adequate
to encourage parents to exercise greater control over the activities of their
children, but it would seem that a transfer of jurisdiction over these cases
to the juvenile court would produce more favorable results in all cases.
The investigative facilities of that court would be of invaluable aid in
determining the true facts of each case and in determining if the parents
are capable of controlling their children in the future. Further, if it were
discovered that parental control was lacking, the social agencies affiliated
with the juvenile court could be called upon for additional assistance. Since
this is the system utilized by the state to deal with anti-social acts of
juveniles, it is not unreasonable to urge that acts which create a likelihood
of anti-social conduct should be treated within the same system.
IV. EVALUATION
Any evaluation of juvenile curfew legislation necessarily must attempt
to balance the effectiveness of the device in achieving its ends with the
likelihood of abuse and the restraint imposed on individuals' freedom of
locomotion. These considerations are relevant to a determination not only
of the social desirability of such legislation -but also of its constitutional
validity. In this section emphasis is placed on the former problem, ac-
companied by some observations on the constitutional issue.
A. Police Control of Groups of Juveniles
Ultimately, there is only one basic objective of curfew legislation: to
reduce the incidence of juvenile criminal activity. If juveniles are con-
strained to remain at home in the evening, the opportunity and temptation
to commit crime is diminished. Further, the curfew implements the ability
of the police to break up groups and gangs of children congregating away
from home at night in order to prevent any consequential illegal endeavor. 65
165. See text and notes at notes 123-26 supra.
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The latter use of the curfew has been undertaken by the Philadelphia
police department. The police report that it has aided considerably in the
attempt to control nighttime accumulations of juveniles, but the extent of
the impact of this device on the over-all criminal picture is incapable of
determination. 166 Nevertheless, the curfew removes the technical strictures
of the law of arrest by permitting the police to take action prior to what
reasonably appears to be an attempted criminal act.16 7 In addition, those
curfew ordinances which extend their prohibitions to eating places and
other enclosed establishments and which provide penalties against pro-
prietors permitting children to remain there after the curfew hour are an
aid to the self-policing of such establishments by the proprietors. This is
true even though the sanction is sporadically invoked as in Philadelphia
where only one such instance was noted. Proprietors can fall back on the
potential sanction against themselves as a reason for excluding juveniles
without incurring their disfavor.
Certain qualifications on the above assessment of the value of a curfew
as a control device need to be made.168 A word or gesture on the part of
the police oftentimes is a more effective deterrent than is the threat of
arrest after questionable activities have begun. The existence of general
loitering ordinances in many municipalities technically provides the police
with the same authority to act as do the prohibitions in many curfew
ordinances.169 These considerations tend to diminish the utility and need
for a curfew. However, those curfew ordinances which prohibit "being"
in certain designated places after the curfew hour are on their face broader
in scope than loitering statutes,"T0 as are those curfew ordinances which
extend their prohibitions to eating places and other enclosed establish-
ments.1 7 ' In addition, even though a curfew ordinance does not prohibit
"being," enforcement, if intensive, has the effect of transforming the ordi-
nance into a "being" type prohibition. The distinction between "being" and
"loitering" is more semantic than real at the enforcement level and similarly,
on the basis of the Philadelphia experience, on the judicial level.172  More-
over, an ordinance labelled a "curfew" popularly conveys the idea that it
prohibits "being" regardless of the specific language in the ordinance. This
166. See text and notes at notes 173-79 infra.
167. See text and notes at notes 110-15 supra. See also The Legal Intelligencer
(Philadelphia), June 25, 1958, p. 1, cols. 1-2.
168. Although the police are technically without authority to act affirmatively in
the absence of what reasonably appears to be an attempted criminal act, actual practice
indicates that in many instances the police are not constrained from interfering in
activities they consider undesirable by considerations of the legality of an arrest. But
the fact that police exceed existing authority should not preclude a conferral of author-
ity to act in those situations where as a matter of legislative policy such authority
should exist.
169. Philadelphia has a loitering ordinance limited in its applicability generally
to conduct in or about public transportation facilities. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA,
CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 10-603 (1956).
170. See text and note at note 43 supra.
171. See text and note at note 52 supra.
172. See text and notes at notes 149-53 supra.
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popular conception of a "curfew" is likely to be reflected in its enforcement
both by police and by parents. Thus, the curfew encompasses a wider range
of conduct than does a criminal loitering or similar type ordinance thereby
providing an increment to existing police authority.
B. Effect on the Incidence of Juvenile Crime
The potential impact of the curfew on the totality of juvenile criminality
is necessarily limited by the fact that it is directed solely at noctural juvenile
crime. However, the amount of such crime is apparently great; the peak
number of complaints received by the Juvenile Aid Bureau occur between
the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 12 midnight.173 This rough index of the
incidence of juvenile criminal activity indicates that an effective curfew
would make a substantial contribution to the alleviation of juvenile criminal
activity. But an accurate determination of the effectiveness of the curfew
in achieving its objective is, as a practical matter, impossible to ascertain.
First, there is no accurate measure of the incidence of criminality during
a given period of time, since a substantial proportion of crimes committed
are undetected.1 74 .Further, the assumption that the number of detected
crimes bears a constant relation to the actual crime rate is hazardous be-
cause the number of recorded crimes varies with changes in police practice,
court policies and public opinion.175 But even if recorded crime were a
reliable index of total criminal activity, there is no method of establishing
the proportion of recorded crime that is committed by juveniles. The
initial classification by age occurs in arrest statistics which are necessarily
imprecise indices of criminal activity. The number of arrests, like the
number of recorded crimes, varies with police and judicial policy and pub-
lic opinion. Moreover, many arrested persons are later found not to be
173. Complaints by Hour-January to December Inclusive
Hour 1955 1956
12:00 noon 729 846
1:00 p.m. 518 739
9:00 900 1,158
10:00 848 713
11:00 803 795
12:00 midnight 674 675
1:00 a.m. 760 822
2:00 832 1,068
3:00 939 1,153
4:00 805 1,003
5:00 958 1,389
6:00 706 840
7:00 779 920
8:00 799 973
9:00 992 1,144
10:00 1,020 1,280
11:00 1,046 1,377
174. For a discussion of the difficulties in arriving at a significant index of
criminality see SUTHERAND & CRassEY, PRINCIPcLS OF CRmINOLOGY 25-38 (5th ed.
1955).
175. Id. at 25.
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answerable for the acts charged against them. This is particularly true of
juveniles who tend, probably, more so than adults, to commit offenses as
groups or gangs. This leads to mass arrests, even though only one or
two members of the group ultimately will be found responsible. 176 But
accepting arrests as a meaningful criterion of the quantum of criminal
activity, there is no method of establishing a correlation between curfew
enforcement and changes in the pattern and number of arrests. There is
no evidence of causal relation between the two, for any assertion that such
a relation exists must take cognizance of the multifarious factors influencing
the incidence of criminality. 177 When the uncertainty of the correlation
between the curfew rate and the arrest rate178 is coupled with the weak-
nesses of the arrest as determinative of the incidence of juvenile criminality,
the only reasonable conclusion is that there is no certainty that curfew
enforcement reduces juvenile nocturnal crime.
Although not provable statistically there are a few generalizations about
the effectiveness of a curfew that may be offered. Curfews probably are
not an aid in crime detection. Curfew violations are uncovered in the
course of police patrol of neighborhoods and are a routinized matter. In
those cases in which apprehension for curfew violation is accompanied by
an arrest 179 it is likely that the arrest would have been made in any event
and that the curfew violation was appended when the arrested juvenile
was discovered to be in the age group subject to the curfew. On the other
hand, the curfew is an aid to police control of the activities of groups or
gangs of juveniles, conferring authority on the police to interrupt juvenile
nocturnal activities before any wrong has occurred.
Viewing the potential impact of the curfew on nocturnal juvenile
crime, certain conclusions seem evident. Those children most likely to be
deterred by the ordinance from remaining outdoors after the curfew hour
are those least likely to engage in criminal activity. Conversely, those
least likely to be deterred are the same children who most probably would
engage in criminal activity. There is, however, one group, those children
on what might be termed the "fringe" of the delinquent community, who
176. Sellin, Observatios on Statistics of Juvenile Delinquency, in CRamE PRn-
VENTIoN ASSOCIATION OF PHi.ADEI' IA, REP'oRT 8 (1956).
177. SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, op. cit. supra note 174, at 138-219.
178. Several statistical comparisons are cited as evidence that the curfew has the
effect of lessening juvenile criminal activity. In 1957, the year of the curfew's most
intensive enforcement, juvenile arrests declined from 10,270 in 1956 to 9,027, a decrease
of 12.1%. Analysis by police district tends to show the same result. In all but six
of the twenty-three districts the arrest rate went down whereas the curfew rate in-
creased in all but two districts. See note 118 supra. While these arguably support
a contention that curfew enforcement reduces juvenile crime, a comparison of similar
figures for the years 1955 and 1956 casts doubt on the validity of the claim. For
example, the number of juvenile arrests increased from 7,953 in 1955 to 10,270 in
1956, an increment of 29.1%. While in the same period curfew violations increased
from 2,051 in the last eleven months of 1955 to 2,990 in the twelve months of 1956,
an increment of 33.6% on the basis of the average number of violations per period.
179. In 1955 of the 2,051 curfew violations 273 were accompanied by arrests. In
1956 arrests were made in 398 of the 2,990 incidents of curfew violation. In 1957
in the 6,973 cases of curfew violation only 266 were appended to arrests of the juvenile.
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would be deterred from remaining away from home at night by their
parents if the threat of a sanction were available against the parents.
Further, the "spur-of-the-moment" nocturnal crime resulting from group
or gang action may be lessened by the fact that late-at-night accumulations
of juveniles are easily detected and can be dispersed under the curfew.
An underlying assumption in all these instances, except the last, is that the
likelihood of criminal activity decreases as the amount of control exercised
by parents over the activities of the juvenile increases; the greater the
breakdown in the social structure of the family unit, the greater the chance
of anti-social behavior by its members. The curfew might be effective to
the extent that parents can be induced, under pain of fine, to exercise their
control where they otherwise might tend to allow their children a freer
rein. Viewing the curfew as having such limited objectives, rather than
as a panacea, it would seem that even though persons may dispute its social
desirability, it certainly is not irrational for a legislative body to experiment
with it in an attempt to stem an increase in juvenile criminality.
C. Constitutional Validity
In doctrinal terms, a state or municipal legislature has the power to
limit any individual right without violating the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment or its state counterparts, if the limitation is reason-
able in view of the need of the state, roughly measured by the gravity of
the evil to be corrected and the importance attributed to the right invaded. 80
Substantive due process demands, as a minimal requirement on legislative
enactments, that there be a rational relation between the end sought and
the means chosen.' 8 ' However, while this relationship between ends and
means may of itself be sufficient to withstand constitutional attack in the
area of economic regulation,t 2 the test is generally more stringent in at-
180. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) ("Liberty of speech and
of the press is not an absolute right, and the state may punish its abuse."). Cf. Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a
panic.").
Assuming that state and federal due process clauses have the same declared sub-
stantive content, state courts theoretically are freer than federal courts to invalidate
state action on due process grounds. Any reluctance on the part of federal courts
to strike down state legislation under the due process clause, induced by considerations
of federal-state relations, is lacking in state courts confronted with constitutional
challenges to state action.
181. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 246-47 (1957);
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555-56, 558-59 (1956).
182. The test for the validity of state regulation of economic interests has been
described as requiring a substantial relation between the means chosen and the end
sought Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950). In
this case the Court stated: "Like any other legislation, a price-fixing order is lawful
if substantially related to a legitimate end sought to be attained. Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and cases therein cited.' Id. at 186. Dicta in cases sub-
sequent to Nebbia v. New York had indicated that the standard of relationship be-
tween means and end in economic cases was that there be only a "rational basis."
See West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 527 (1945).
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tempts to validate legislative limitations on the "indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment." 13 In the latter situation the
legislative restraint "must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending." -1
While the interests of those persons affected by a curfew are not within
the scope of the rights described in the first amendment, made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth, restraints on individual liberty should
likewise be judged by a standard more severe than that applied to economic
regulation. Considering the type of curfew ordinance currently prevalent,
two private interests are identifiable. The first is the interest of the juve-
niles, the primary subjects of the curfew, to be free to venture away from
home. Whether this interest on the part of juveniles be characterized as
the "right of locomotion" or as a "necessary ingredient of the integrity of
the individual" or by some less stirring term, undoubtedly it is within the
ambit of the constitutional protection afforded by the word "liberty" in
the fourteenth amendment. 8 5 The exercise of an unlimited power to
confine individuals to their homes would strike to the core of the demo-
cratic ethic. The fourteenth amendment presumably affords protection
against the exercise of such a power, even though there might be a ra-
tional basis for an enactment requiring persons to remain at home while
not at work or at school as a means of reducing the incidence of criminality
in public places. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the adoption of
measures that would be indistinguishable from those practiced in police
states. The second identifiable interest is that of the parents, legally re-
sponsible for violations by juveniles under most curfew ordinances, in being
free from state control and direction of the manner in which their juvenile
children are to be regimented. This latter interest is, to a large extent,
derivative of the interest of the juveniles noted above, and a resolution of
the validity of the curfew with respect to juveniles which is adverse to the
state or municipality would be determinative of the issue of validity with
respect to adults. Although it does not necessarily follow, it would seem
that, conversely, the imposition on parents of responsibility for the night-
time whereabouts of their children under a curfew constitutionally valid as
to the children should not be unlawful.186
Judicial guidance on the particular constitutional issue involved in
curfew regulation of juveniles is sparse. Although there is some authority
183. Id. at 530.
184. Ibid.
185. While there are no federal cases on point, state cases indicate that such an
interest is cognizable under state due process clauses. See note 188 infra. In other
contexts the Supreme Court has given recognition and protection to interests analogous
to that in the instant case. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (criminal
registration) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (right of persons to freely
enter and take up residence in another state). Cf. also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
125 (1958) (right to travel in foreign countries).
186. See Comment, 1 VuL. L. REV. 51, 57-58 (1956).
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concerning the control of the free movement of adults,' 87 the interest of
children in being abroad during the night hours is not nearly so important
to the social, economic and healthful well-being of the community, and
there is, therefore, reason to believe that this legislation will receive different
judicial consideration. The federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
have not yet been presented with the problem in any case. The scarce
authority that exists, represented by a few state court decisions, 88 affords
little help in analyzing the constitutional problem. The particular ordi-
nances which were approved or rejected in those cases do not contain
features which might meaningfully serve as significant points for distinguish-
ing the valid from the invalid regulatory measures. In those cases in which
curfews were found invalid, for example, emphasis was frequently placed
on the statutory language used to define the illegal conduct. Thus, a pro-
hibition of "remaining or loitering" has been sustained and distinguished
from a prohibition of "being" on the streets.' 89 In view of the generally
synonymous interpretation given to these terms at the enforcement and
administrative levels,19 0 a judicial determination on this ground seems
fallacious.
The basic inquiry of whether the local need for a curfew limitation is
sufficiently great to be a reasonable governmental restraint in view of its
serious invasion of individual liberties has not been articulately considered
by any court. The opinions, in the main, sound in the stark conclusions of
"reasonableness" or "unreasonableness" without shedding light on the gen-
uine bases for their decisions. It would seem, however, that there are
several significant factors relevant to this determination which, unlike
judicial intuition, may be isolated and subjected to some degree of factual
exploration. Without judicial articulation of the specific considerations
which indicate unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, governmental
restrictions of juveniles, municipal legislatures are without any direction to
aid them in considering their own local conditions to accurately determine
which type of curfew ordinance, if any, they might properly enact. An
attempt will here be made to suggest some of the factors which the writers
187. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ; Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (19.43) (military curfew
imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry living on West Coast during World War
II) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
188. Constitutional: People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (App.
Dep't 1945); Baker v. Borough of Steelton, 17 Dauphin County R. 17 (Pa. Q.S.
1910). Unconstitutional: Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 148 Cal.
App. 2d 419, 306 P2d 601 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ; Riley v. City of Miami, Chancery
No. 198087, Cir. Ct. of lth Cir. of Fla., April 5, 1957; Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex.
Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). But cf. Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 Fed. 93 (9th Cir.
1916) (upholding an ordinance of Juneau, Alabama, which forbade all idle or dis-
solute persons or those with no visible means of support from wandering on the streets
after 11 p.m.).
189. E.g., compare People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 151 P.2d 498 (App.
Dep't 1945), with Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 148 Cal. App. 2d
419, 306 P.2d 601 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
190. See text and notes at notes 43-46 supra.
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believe are fundamental to a rational evaluation of the constitutional
problem.
In broad outline, the question might be phrased in terms of weighing
the seriousness of the evil to be prevented and the need for this type of
measure to effectuate the cure, against the gravity of the invasion of the in-
dividual liberties of the persons restricted by the ordinance. The evil which
these laws are designed to correct is readily subject to demonstration.
Should a relatively low rate of juvenile crime be shown to exist in a
particular community, the need for so severe a general popular regulation
might immediately be disproved. Even if the amount of juvenile criminal
activity is of major proportions, the need for curfew control is almost im-
possible of proof. Existing police statistics, as previously discussed, dis-
close no definitive correlation between the enforcement of a curfew and
the diminution of nocturnal juvenile anti-social conduct.119 This aspect
of the problem, however, might be accepted on its theoretical grounds alone,
i.e., that keeping children off the street is likely to have some relation to
the discovery of those juveniles who have embarked on a criminal escapade.
It might well be proper to permit a legislature to experiment with such a
procedure were the attendant injuries not too severe. In end result the
considerations on the other side of the balance, i.e., the extent of the in-
vasion of the individual liberties and the harshness of the restriction on
those subject to it, will be more determinative of the issue. These factors,
by contrast, would appear to be subject to some greater degree of probative
exploration. The time at which a curfew should commence, for example,
will be determined in part by what police statistics reveal to be the significant
hours of crime commission, but in even greater measure should be deter-
mined by the community sense of the proper time for cessation of outdoor
juvenile social activity. Parents of diverse cultural backgrounds might
well disagree on the amount of evening social activity which is desirable
for their children in order to mold mature and healthy adult personalities.
Certainly children might be turned indoors at a relatively early hour in,
for example, a community primarily populated by parents of Pennsylvania
Dutch background when a similar regulation would be properly considered
overburdensome in a metropolitan area where teen-age evening social
activities are parentally encouraged. Furthermore, an inquiry into the in-
door recreational facilities available to the local juvenile residents would
seem to be of crucial importance. In a city with overcrowded or slum
areas, the character of the actual housing facilities might be such that there
simply is not adequate living space indoors to permit children, required to re-
main at home some hours before bedtime, to healthfully occupy their time-
particularly in the summer when school vacations permit even later waking
hours. In such a community the provisions of the curfew might be entirely
intolerable and unreasonable while the identical law, providing the same
hours and applicable to the same age groups, would be far less subject to
191. See text and notes at notes 174-78 supra.
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attack in a wealthy suburban area where most homes are equipped with
playrooms, television sets and the like. Similarly, the character of public
recreational facilities provided in a particular community would have direct
bearing on the reasonableness of a requirement that children remain in their
homes in the evening. The danger of anti-social activity is far less where
juveniles may constructively occupy themselves away from home than where
they may only roam the streets. Consideration of the existence of such
facilities would likewise be relevant to the determination of the nature of
the exceptions from the curfew restriction which must reasonably be per-
mitted.
Although these considerations, and others like them, would seem es-
sential to a meaningful evaluation of the constitutionality of curfew ordi-
nances, no court has yet articulately discussed them when treating the
problem. With judicial authority in such a state, one can only speculate
as to how a court might decide this fundamental issue of validity should it
be adequately presented by counsel and seriously considered by the court.
H.L.
R.R.O.
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